



Terrorism Threat Briefing – FAM Russia (06/02/14)

The following briefing guide is designed to give you a visualised overview of key threat actors during your time at Sochi. It will present you with:

- Names, recent images, and key biographical information around primary tier terror suspects (Militant Profiles)
- Trend analysis on Olympic terrorism incidents; Russia; and Sochi region
- FAM summary analysis (including insider threat)

Section 1: Militant Profiles:

Please note that these images are only a representation of physical appearance at time of image capture.

Militant 1A:



Aslan Byutukayev (Аслан Бютукаев), October 22, 1974, Achkhoy-Martan) also known as Amir Khamzat, Chechen Islamist commander in charge of the Caucasus Emirate's Riyad-us Saliheen Brigade of Martyrs, succeeding Said Buryatsky.

In January 2011 Byutukaev trained Magomed Yevloyev, the suicide bomber who carried out the bombing of Domodedovo International Airport in Moscow.

In July 2011, during a meeting of the Caucasus Emirate's Sharia Court, Dokka Umarov appointed Byutukaev his deputy in the newly created Western Sector of Vilayat Nokhchicho.

Militant 1B:



Doku (Dokka) Khamatovich Umarov (Доку Хаматович Умаров), April 13, 1964, Kharsenoi), Chechen Islamist commander, former president of the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (2006-2007) and later self-proclaimed “Emir” of the Emirate of Caucasus.

Umarov progressively became closer to the global jihadist movement and in November 2007 he officially declared the creation of the Islamic Emirate of Caucasus and expressed solidarity with “brothers” in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Palestine.

Umarov claimed responsibility for several attacks on Russian civilians, including the 2010 Moscow Metro bombings and the 2011 Domodedovo International Airport bombing.

Militant 1C:



Rozana Ibragimova, Розана Ахмадиевна Ибрагимова, 23, the widow of a militant killed in shootout in the Russian Dagestan region. She was identified as a possible suicide bomber who might already be in Sochi for the Olympic Games.

Ibragimova, also known as Ruzan or Salima, is said to have a 10 centimeter (4inch) scar across her left cheek, a limp, and an arm that doesn't bend at the elbow.

FSB statement (January 2014): "According to our information Ms. Ibragimova may be used by the ringleaders of illegal armed groups for the organization of terrorist acts in the zone of the 2014 Olympics." There is a possibility that Ibragimova managed to penetrate the security cordon or if she was already present before the "steel wall" was put up. Given possible visual disparities a third image has been included (see left, below):



Militant 1D:



Jhannet Tsakhaeva, джаннет цахаева, aged 34 from Dagestan (see right image)
Thought to have been travelling in Rostov-on-Don environs in late January in
preparation for an attack on the Olympic Torch relay.

Militant 1E:



Zaira Alieva, Заира Алиева, aged 26. For photo image also see LEFT image in
Militant 1D profile (above).

Militant 1F and Militant IG:



The two individuals above have been identified as brothers Sulayman and Abdurrahman (oft Abdul Rahman or Abdurakhman).

In a video released by a credible jihadist website two Dagestani militants claim responsibility for the Volgograd bombings and threaten more attacks for the Winter Olympics in Sochi. One or both are possibly the males who provided a diseased female suicide bomber with a rucksack IED.

In the video the two individuals linked to the group Ansar al-Sunah, a branch of Caucasus Emirate Mujahideen located in Dagestan, claimed to have a “surprise” for their enemy Russia, and one for tourists that are planning to visit Russia. Copy: “If you hold these Olympics, we will give you a present for the innocent Muslim blood being spilled all around the world: in Afghanistan, in Somalia, in Syria,” they say. “For the tourists who come, there will be a present, too.”


In the 49-minute video released around January 20, 2014, there are no flags belonging to the Emirate of Caucasus and no Chechen colors; instead a black banner with a religious verse that is typically associated with al Qaeda-linked extremists and in particular with the Islamic State of Iraq.

Other suspects at large:

Ruslan Saufutdinov, 21, and Murad Musaev, 25

Section 2: Trend Analysis:


Graphic 1: Olympics terrorism trends - general:



Graphic 2: The Sochi region and her neighbours – proximity and topography:



Graphic 3: Terrorism attacks in Russia 1992-2012



Russia Summary:

Terrorist attacks have occurred in 50 of Russia's federal areas (Krai's). Only eight attacks have taken place in Krasnodar Krai, the area of the North Caucasus region where Sochi is located on the Black Sea. However, the majority of attacks in Russia are geographically concentrated in nearby North Caucasian republics, including in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino- Balkaria, North Ossetia-Alania, Stavropol Krai, and Karachay-Cherkessia. Attacks also occurred frequently in Moscow and to a lesser extent, Saint Petersburg and Sverdlosk Oblast. (START Russia terrorism report: 2013)

The frequency of terrorist attacks in Russia has been steadily increasing over the past two decades, ranging from approximately 20 attacks in 1992 to a peak of more than 250 in 2010. However, in 2011 and 2012 there were considerable declines in both total attacks and fatal attacks. Preliminary data indicate that this downward trend in the frequency of attacks continues through the first six months of 2013. (START: 2013)

FAM Analysis:

Major sporting events do attract rare interventions of terrorism. Not so much Winter Olympiads; possibly due to terrorist predilections to target more accessible and escapable urban environments (until the re-emergence of suicide bombing tactics).

Moreover, militant individuals and groups are usually very aware not to cause excessive physical and reputational 'collateral' damage to their own people, or sympathetic, audiences.

However, Sochi 2014 is almost uniquely high in 'motivational' terrorism threat levels for an Olympiad because the most 'likely' groups to carry out a mass-casualty armed attack – Caucasus-based jihadist networks – will consider that:

- a) they have no perceived allies or financial sponsors in attendance,
- b) most identified 'wanted' terror suspects are known to hold personal, emotional motivations to personally harm Russian authority employees, and/or strategically harm Russia and perceived outside supporters,
- c) they will view the location to be occupied land annexed by a brutal expansionist, infidel force, the Russian Federation. The de facto threat level at Sochi (and across Russia's main cities) will therefore be 'severe' ranging potentially to 'critical' at all times. Such high risk ratings can only be mitigated to a certain level due to protective security measures. We cannot predict levels of mitigation until we begin to witness first-hand operational delivery and co-ordination in Sochi itself.
- d) a plethora of international commentary and analysis has pitched quite a provocative news narrative around whether armed groups do have the capacity to harm Russia during 'lock down' and also whether Russia can cope. For jihadist adversaries, this is literally a 'God Given' opportunity for vengeance and to make their case to 'uneducated' international audiences. (The same strategy was used by

the PLO-backed Black September to propel the 'Palestinian problem' into international consciousness at the 1972 Munich Olympics.)

Three final factors to consider at this point:

- 1) The reputational pressure on Russia and how this may play out operationally on the ground in Sochi. Risk ratings around accidental (but limited) active shooter scenarios may well be considered to have increased due to overly motivated or hyper-vigilant official Russian security. This risk will increase after any major security incident takes place and will rise and repeat as a continuum commensurate to the amount of hostile security incidents occurring.
- 2) Moreover, an 'insider threat' from an accredited armed person within the official security layer remains always a possibility. Security agents should remain strongly vigilant at all times around all persons that they and their guests come into contact with.
- 3) Identified and unidentified militants do have the motivation, resources, and support networks to also become embedded within the security zone; perhaps as spectators, workers, security officials, support staff. If they do breach security layers, they are likely to seek out more anonymous roles, where attention will be unlikely to be drawn to them and extra security vetting is required. (Therefore it may be implausible but not impossible for them to portray themselves as a competitor or coach.)

NB: Please note that no quantitative risk matrices have been provided in this briefing due to the difficulty in assessing existing protective security mitigation measures (risk treatments) in Russia at this time.

ENDS> 02/06/2014